[7] E.g. 0000003265 00000 n Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). 0000003954 00000 n Within these levels of analysis, there are different theories that have could be considered. There is no certainty that the stag will arrive; the hare is present. Moreover, they also argue that pursuing all strategies at once would also be suboptimal (or even impossible due to mutual exclusivity), making it even more important to know what sort of game youre playing before pursuing a strategy[59]. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. [42] Vally Koubi, Military Technology Races, International Organization 53, 3(1999): 537565. In 2016, the Obama Administration developed two reports on the future of AI. For example, it is unlikely that even the actor themselves will be able to effectively quantify their perception of capacity, riskiness, magnitude of risk, or magnitude of benefits. See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. Collision isdisastrousfor everyone, but swerving is losing bad too. international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Table 4. trailer Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. [27] An academic survey conducted showed that AI experts and researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years. [6], Aumann proposed: "Let us now change the scenario by permitting pre-play communication. 0000001656 00000 n Here, values are measured in utility. Payoff variables for simulated Chicken game. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. She dismisses Clausewitz with the argument that he saw war as "the use of military means to defeat another state" and that this approach to warfare is no longer applicable in today's conflicts. d [5] As a result, it is becoming increasingly vital to understand and develop strategies to manage the human process of developing AI. [20] Will Knight, Could AI Solve the Worlds Biggest Problems? MIT Technology Review, January 12, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. These two concepts refer to how states will act in the international community. Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. What are some good examples of coordination games? The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach Payoff variables for simulated Stag Hunt, Table 14. The payoff matrix in Figure 1 illustrates a generic stag hunt, where In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. It is the goal this paper to shed some light on these, particularly how the structure of preferences that result from states understandings of the benefits and harms of AI development lead to varying prospects for coordination. The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. The complex machinations required to create a lasting peace may well be under way, but any viable agreementand the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces that would entailrequires an Afghan government capable of holding its ground on behalf of its citizens and in the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. in . Last Resort, Legitimate authority, Just cause, high probablity of succession, right intention, proportionality, casualities. c [10] AI expert Andrew Ng says AI is the new electricity | Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch, September 20, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSCka8vXaJc. Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. 15. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. What is the difference between 'negative' and 'positive' peace? If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. (required), 2023 Cornell University Powered by Edublogs Campus and running on blogs.cornell.edu, The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction The stag hunters are likely to interact with other stag hunters to seek mutual benefit, while hare hunters rarely care with whom they interact with since they rather not depend on others for success. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. In addition to leadership, the formation of a small but successful group is also likely to influence group dynamics. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. 695 20 Press: 1992). In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? Table 9. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. Deadlock occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." For example, most land disputes, like the ongoing Chinese andJapanesedisputeover the Senkaku Islands, must be resolved bycompromisingin other areas of policy in order to achieve the goal. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. This essay first appeared in the Acheson Prize 2018 Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. Posted June 3, 2008 By Presh Talwalkar. On the other hand, Glaser[46] argues that rational actors under certain conditions might opt for cooperative policies. In addition to the pure strategy Nash equilibria there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Discuss. Despite the large number of variables addressed in this paper, this is at its core a simple theory with the aims of motivating additional analysis and research to branch off. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. For example, Jervis highlights the distinguishability of offensive-defensive postures as a factor in stability. (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. %%EOF Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. Examples of the stag hunt [ edit] The original stag hunt dilemma is as follows: a group of hunters have tracked a large stag, and found it to follow a certain path. In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. [19] UN News, UN artificial intelligence summit aims to tackle poverty, humanitys grand challenges, United Nations, June 7, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/558962-un-artificial-intelligence-summit-aims-tackle-poverty-humanitys-grand. Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. It involves a group of . How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. Using game theoretical representations of state preferences, Downs et al. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Several animal behaviors have been described as stag hunts. One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. (lljhrpc). The Nash equilibrium for each nation is to cheat, so it would be irrational to do otherwise. In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. When looking at these components in detail, however, we see that the anticipated benefits and harms are linked to whether the actors cooperate or defect from an AI Coordination Regime. Table 11. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. A hurried U.S. exit will incentivize Afghanistans various competing factions more than ever before to defect in favor of short-term gains on the assumption that one of the lead hunters in the band has given up the fight. What should Franks do? [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . xref International Relations Classical Realism- Morganthau- anarchy is assumed as a prominent concern in international relations,with the international Stag Hunt A persons choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other persons or peoples choice. Every country operates selfishly in the international order. A day passes. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? Both games are games of cooperation, but in the Stag-hunt there is hope you can get to the "good" outcome. Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) Your application of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. This is visually represented in Table 4 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Table 5. The matrix above provides one example. Read the following questions. Beding (2008), but also in international relations (Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994). 0000018184 00000 n This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. Under the assumption that actors have a combination of both competing and common interests, those actors may cooperate when those common interests compel such action. We are all familiar with the basic Prisoners Dilemma. Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. The response from Kabul involved a predictable combination of derision and alarm, for fear that bargaining will commence on terms beyond the current administrations control. 0000000696 00000 n To be sustained, a regime of racial oppression requires cooperation. Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. [54] In a bilateral AI development scenario, the distribution variable can be described as an actors likelihood of winning * percent of benefits gained by winner (this would be reflected in the terms of the Coordination Regime). Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) b The hunters hide and wait along a path. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. For instance if a=10, b=5, c=0, and d=2. As is customary in game theory, the first number in each cell represents how desirable the outcome is for Row (in this case, Actor A), and the second number represents how desirable the same outcome is for Column (Actor B). [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. Absolute gains looks at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only looks at the individual gains in respect to others. Published by the Lawfare Institute in Cooperation With, Lawfare Resources for Teachers and Students, Documents Related to the Mueller Investigation, highly contentious presidential elections, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. .more Dislike Share Noah Zerbe 6.48K subscribers Table 2. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. Moreover, the usefulness of this model requires accurately gauging or forecasting variables that are hard to work with. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. The familiar Prisoners Dilemma is a model that involves two actors who must decide whether to cooperate in an agreement or not. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. endstream endobj 12 0 obj <>stream PRICE CODE 17. . The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. 0000006962 00000 n Two, three, four hours pass, with no trace. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. Some have accused rivals of being Taliban sympathizers while others have condemned their counterparts for being against peace. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. [13] And impressive victories over humans in chess by AI programs[14] are being dwarfed by AIs ability to compete with and beat humans at exponentially more difficult strategic endeavors like the games of Go[15] and StarCraft. The most important role of the U.S. presence is to keep the Afghan state afloat, and while the negotiations may turn out to be a positive development, U.S. troops must remain in the near term to ensure the possibility of a credible deal. 695 0 obj Together, this is expressed as: One last consideration to take into account is the relationship between the probabilities of developing a harmful AI for each of these scenarios. [1] Kelly Song, Jack Ma: Artificial intelligence could set off WWIII, but humans will win, CNBC, June 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/21/jack-ma-artificial-intelligence-could-set-off-a-third-world-war-but-humans-will-win.html. In this scenario, however, both actors can also anticipate to the receive additional anticipated harm from the defector pursuing their own AI development outside of the regime. 0000006229 00000 n In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. Here, we assume that the harm of an AI-related catastrophe would be evenly distributed amongst actors. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. Uneven distribution of AIs benefits couldexacerbate inequality, resulting in higher concentrations of wealth within and among nations. 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC However, if one doesn't, the other wastes his effort. For the cooperator (here, Actor B), the benefit they can expect to receive from cooperating would be the same as if both actors cooperated [P_(b|B) (AB)b_Bd_B]. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Prisoners Dilemma game. 0000004367 00000 n Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a game in Deadlock. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 8. Members of the Afghan political elite have long found themselves facing a similar trade-off. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? The heated debate about the possibility of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, prompted by recent negotiations between the U.S. government and the Taliban, has focused understandably on the military value of security assistance. Furthermore, in June 2017, China unveiled a policy strategy document unveiling grand ambitions to become the world leader in AI by 2030. and other examples to illustrate how game theory might be applied to understand the Taiwan Strait issue. Is human security a useful approach to security? a Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. [25] For more on the existential risks of Superintelligence, see Bostrom (2014) at Chapters 6 and 8. Moreover, each actor is more confident in their own capability to develop a beneficial AI than their opponents. The academic example is the Stag Hunt. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. Rousseau recognized that the ine cient outcome hunting hare may result, just as conict can result in the security dilemma, and proceeded to provide philosophical arguments in favor of the outcome where both hunters . As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? As such, Chicken scenarios are unlikely to greatly affect AI coordination strategies but are still important to consider as a possibility nonetheless. [9] That is, the extent to which competitors prioritize speed of development over safety (Bostrom 2014: 767). For example, international sanctions involve cooperation against target countries (Martin, 1992a; Drezner, . [50] This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. How can the security dilemma be mitigated and transcended? A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. Why do trade agreements even exist? Downs et al. Especially as prospects of coordinating are continuous, this can be a promising strategy to pursue with the support of further landscape research to more accurately assess payoff variables and what might cause them to change. The first technology revolution caused World War I. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. In the current Afghan context, the role of the U.S. military is not that of third-party peacekeeper, required to guarantee the peace in disinterested terms; it has the arguably less burdensome job of sticking around as one of several self-interested hunters, all of whom must stay in the game or risk its collapse. Payoff matrix for simulated Chicken game. Payoff matrix for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistans internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. The remainder of this section looks at these payoffs and the variables that determine them in more detail.[53]. In the Prisoner's dilemma, defect is a dominant strategy and only the bad outcome is possible. But the moral is not quite so bleak. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). hunting stag is successful only if both hunters hunt stag, while each hunter can catch a less valuable hare on his own. Read about me, or email me. One hunter can catch a hare alone with less effort and less time, but it is worth far less than a stag and has much less meat.